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WITTGENSTEIN TESTS MR. JUSTICE HOLMES:
ON HOLMES'S PROPOSAL TO SEPARATE
LEGAL CONCEPTS FROM MORAL CONCEPTS
THOMAS D. EISELE*

When Wittgenstein depicts himself being accused
of "destroying everything of interest and
importance," he replies, in effect, that if what he has
done is destructive, what is destroyed cannot have
been of genuine interest-it was always a house of
cards. Interest and importance in Philosophical
Investigations are everywhere to be tested for their
interest and importance-an ancient demand
philosophy imposes upon itself, from Plato's
Republic to Thoreau's Walden.
-Stanley Cavell!
Do the comments of Mr. Justice Holmes on American law
interest us today? Are Holmes's remarks on what law is, or about
legal education in America and how we .might study and learn our
legal system, important to today's legal world? If Stanley Cavell is
correct in thinking that philosophy-whether old or newdemands a say in testing anything that claims our interest, or that
purports to have a place of importance in our lives, then these
questions asked of Holmes's writings are genuine philosophical
quenes.
Similar questions have been pursued Socratically, as is familiar
from the Apology. In making his defense statement to his jurors,
Socrates excuses the burden and the imposition that he thrusts
upon his Athenian neighbors by claiming that both he and his
neighbors need to examine their lives. 2 At his trial for impious
behavior, Socrates implores his audience to expend the time and
energy required to discover what interests them and what is truly

* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Author of
BITTER KNOWLEDGE: LEARNING SOCRATIC LESSONS OF DISILLUSION AND
RENEWAL (Univ. Notre Dame Press 2009).
I STANLEY CAVELL, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, in PHILOSOPHY
lHE DAY AFTER TOMORROW 111, 114 (Harvard Univ. Press 2005).
2 PLATO, Apology, in THE TRIAL AND DEAlH OF SOCRATES 31, 39 [28e-29a,
38a] (G.M.A. Grube trans., revised by John M. Cooper, 3d ed. Hackett Publ'g
Co. 2000).
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important to their community. 3 From a more modem perspective,
however, we can pursue these questions with a Wittgensteinian
emphasis rather than a Socratic one; that is, we can ask whether
Wittgenstein's later philosophy might afford us help in assessing
the interest or the value of one of Holmes's signature remarks
about the law and its study.
I. INITIAL BEARINGS
In the writings that constitute Wittgenstein's later work,4 we
find the suggestion that much of what troubles us in the
philosophical inspection of our lives can be traced to our
misunderstanding how we have expressed ourselves in this world.
It would not be correct to say that this problematic element is
simply a matter of misunderstanding language. Rather,
Wittgenstein implies that clarifying this problematic element may
require us to investigate and to gain clarity on our relationship with
our words, with what we say (or are inclined to say, or are tempted
to say) in certain circumstances. So, for example, in his
Philosophical Investigations, we find Wittgenstein saying,
"Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence
by means oflanguage."s
I am interested that in this remark, Wittgenstein does not say
whether he finds language to be our bane or our salvation. If
philosophy is a battle against the "bewitchment of our
intelligence," Wittgenstein still does not make clear whether the
phrase "by means of language" indicates the source of our
bewitchment (i.e., what causes us to be bewitched), or whether it
tells us how philosophy combats the bewitchment of our
intelligence-namely, that we battle our own bewitchment by
using the therapeutic means that our language makes available to
us.
This is a useful equivocation and one perhaps intended by
Wittgenstein. If I understand this aspect of his later philosophy,
Wittgenstein is suggesting that language aids and abets us when we
get in our own way, while simultaneously recognizing that
language is also the means by which we untangle ourselves.
Language is one cause of-and one route. toward gaining some
relief from-our ills. Human beings are the language-animal par
3Id. at 32-33 [29d-30a, 30a-b].
4 These writings date from the 1930s and 1940s, and most were not made
public until after Wittgenstein's death in 1951.
5 LUDWIG WITIGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § lO9 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. Macmillan 1968) (1953).
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excellence, and we live and fonn our lives largely within the
medium of language. Its ills are our ills, its failings are our failings,
and vice versa.
This observation marks a point of intimacy between
Wittgenstein's understanding and Holmes's apparent vision of the
law. Wittgenstein suggests that we find our way through the world
with the help of language and that we also lose our way via these
same means. 6 Holmes, too, is sensitive to the role that language
plays in orienting ourselves with respect to the world. For example,
in The Path o/the Law, Holmes says:
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals,
and by the mere force of language continually
invites us to pass from one domain to the other
without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we
have the boundary constantly before our minds. The
law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and
intent, and negligence, and so forth, and nothing is
easier, or, I may say, more common in legal
reasoning, than to take these words in their moral
sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to drop
into fallacy. 7
We could almost expect to find such a remark among the
numbered sections of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.
Here, Holmes is warning us that "the mere force of language
continually invites us to pass from one domain," the law, "to the
other," morality, "without perceiving it." We are not watching or
noticing the semantic difference between legal tenns and moral
tenns that share the same spelling, and so we "drop into fallacy."
We become entangled in our words-despite the fact that these
words are intended to be helpful-and thus we lose our way.
For Holmes, the danger in studying the law is that we take over
words that are used in both the law and moral discourse and forget
that the uses of these words may be quite different in each domain.
We confuse or conflate them and fall into fallacy in our legal
reasoning, treating as a legal attribute something that is actually a
moral or ethical one.
Now, compare this Holmesian claim with a famous tag from
Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein casts a thought
Id. and accompanying text.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path o/the Law, 10 HARv.
459-60 (1897).
6

7

L. REv. 457,
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very similar to Holmes's: "A picture held us captive. And we
could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."s For Wittgenstein, we are
subject to a fixation, an unscrutinized way of taking our words-a
way of hearing or understanding someone's expressions-and we
lo
fall into a state of captivity,9 a state of bewitchment. One reason
we find it so difficult to avoid this captivation by our words-this
bewitchment of our intelligence-is that the picture itself, the
fixation or cliche, "lay in our language and language seemed to
repeat it to us inexorably."ll We cannot get outside our language,
and so the only way through our problem is by means of the very
same medium from which our problem stems.
Holmes asks us to imagine the "force of language continually
invit[ing] us to pass from one domain to the other without
perceiving it,,,l2 while Wittgenstein proposes that we consider the
thought that a "picture" or fixation "lay in our language and
language seem[s] to repeat it to us inexorably."l3 These twin
portraits of our domination or entrancement by language are
remarkably similar.
There is a further point of intimacy between the views of
Wittgenstein and of Holmes. At an early juncture in his essay,
Holmes says:
The first thing for a business-like understanding
of the matter is to understand its limits, and
therefore I think it desirable at once to point out and
dispel a confusion between morality and law, which
sometimes arises to the height of conscious theory,
and more often and indeed constantly is making
trouble in detail without reaching the point of
consciousness. l4
Holmes attributes our lack of understanding and our lack of care in
observing the limit or boundary between law and morality to
something we fail to realize. "[M]ore often," Holmes claims, "and
indeed constantly," this confusion on our part about the boundary
8

WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 115 (emphasis in original).

9

Id.

!d. § 109.
Id. § 115.
12 Holmes, supra note 7, at 459. See also infra text accompanying note 39
(where Holmes speaks in terms of "the trap which legal language lays for us").
13 WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § lIS.
14 Holmes, supra note 7, at 459.
\0

11
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between law and morality, "is makin trouble in detail without
reaching the point of consciousness.,,1 As I read Holmes, one of
his central goals in writing his essay (or in delivering his lecture to
the students at Boston University) was to make us conscious of this
boundary and to emphasize our need to keep the boundary between
domains clearly and distinctly before our minds whenever we are
studying law or thinking about some point of legal right or legal
duty.
Wittgenstein, too, wants to make us conscious of somethingsomething we are apt to forget. In section 109 of the
Investigations, just before the line about philosophy being a battle
against our bewitchment, Wittgenstein says the following:
[P]hilosophical problems . . . . are, of course, not
empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by
looking into the workings of our language, and that
in such a way as to make us recognize those
workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand
them. The problems are solved, not by giving new
information, but by arranging what we have always
known. 16
And just sections before this point in the Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein sets the stage for this conception of
philosophical problems and their solution:
Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out
new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our
investigation that we do not seek to learn anything
new by it. We want to understand something that is
already in plain view. For this is what we seem in
some sense not to understand. 17
In these remarks, Wittgenstein describes his philosophical
practice as an attempt to get us to realize or recognize something
with which we are familiar but which we have a difficult time
understanding or articulating. Holmes speaks in terms of drawing a
distinction between law and morality-a distinction with which we
are already familiar-but one we find difficult to remember or to
keep present in our consciousness. Holmes says of the conflation
15

I d.

16

WIlTGENSTEIN, supra note 5,

17

I d. § 89, ~b.

§ 109.
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of this distinction that it "constantly is making trouble in detail
without reaching the point of consciousness.,,18 In a similar vein,
Wittgenstein says:
The aspects of things that are most important for
us are hidden because of their simplicity and
familiarity. (One is unable to notice somethingbecause it is always before one's eyes.) The real
foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all.
Unless that fact has at some time struck him.-And
this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen,
is most striking and most powerful. 19
Both men share the task of getting us to realize or to understand
something about which we already are familiar, but which is hard
for us to remember or to keep present and alive in our
conSCIOusness.
Where these two men diverge is in their diagnosis of what
might make us aware of our dormant experience---our unconscious
knowledge. For Holmes, reaching clarity as to the line or boundary
between law and morality can be achieved by isolating and
removing the offending verbiage. Once we enforce this boundary
by means of excision---cutting, as it were, a clear path between the
domain of law and the domain of morality---our confusion should
subside. 2o
For Wittgenstein, however, the solution is not so clear-cut.
Human frailty and human language being what they are, the
reduction of confusion is the work of a lifetime. Since we
repetitively fall into these traps for the unwary, we must
repetitively climb out of them.
We want to establish an order in our knowledge
of the use of language: an order with a particular
end in view; one out of many possible orders; not
the order. To this end we shall constantly be giving
prominence to distinctions which our ordinary
forms of language easily make us overlook. This
may make it look as if we saw it as our task to
reform language.

Holmes, supra note 7, at 459.
WmGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 129.
20 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
18

19
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[But i]t is not our aim to refine or complete the
system of rules for the use of our words in unheardof ways .
. . . Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by
examples; and the series of examples can be broken
off.-Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated),
not a single problem. 21
Wittgenstein's sense of closure in dealing with our
philosophical problems holds out no hope of a solution found and
achieved once and for all, whereas Holmes seems not only to hope
for one, but also to promise one. Holmes proposes a project of
reclamation, reclaiming a clear line of demarcation between law
and morality. For Wittgenstein, there is no such cure for being a
fallible human who inherits a native language.
II. HOLMES'S TUTORIAL FOR LAW STUDENTS
The Path of the Law is an address originally delivered by
Holmes to students at Boston University Law School; later, it was
published in the Harvard Law Review. These events took place
back in 1897. How is it possible that an address delivered (albeit
by an esteemed jurist and student of the Anglo-American law) and
published more than 110 years ago can still interest the American
legal community in the twenty-first century?
That Holmes's writing does in fact ·still interest us is shown by
some recent events. In 1997, for example, marking the centenary
of Holmes's lecture, there were several symposia and law review
issues (even books of commentary) devoted solely to our
continued fascination with The Path of the Law.22 More recently,
in a 2006 book called The Canon ofAmerican Legal Thought,23 the
editors (both of whom are Harvard law professors) gave pride of
place in that volume as the lead essay (and the only essay drawn
from the nineteenth century) to Holmes's foundational text.
Empirically speaking, interest in Holmes's remarks on legal

WfITGENSTEIN, supra note 5, §§ 132-33.
See, e.g., Symposium, The Path of the Law 100 Years Later: Holmes's
Influence on Modern Jurisprudence, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1997); see also THE
PATH OF THE LAW AND Irs INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR. (Steven Burton ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
23 DAVID KENNEDY & WILLIAM FISHER, THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT (princeton Univ. Press 2006).
21

22
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education is still possible within the legal academy in today's
twenty-first-century world. The question remains: Why?
Part of our continuing fascination with Holmes's essay may be
that in this writing, unlike in his formal opinions, Holmes speaks
not with the voice of a judge, but rather with the voice of a teacher.
Presenting his thoughts from the perspective of a tutor or teacher
may well make Holmes less forbidding and more amiable as an
intellectual companion than when he speaks as an official oracle of
the law. In this lecture-essay, Holmes offers to the students at
Boston University his thoughts on how best to study and
understand the Anglo-American common law system: "I wish, if I
can, to lay down some first principles for the study of this bodl of
dogma or systematized prediction which we call the law .... ,,2
Another possible factor to account for our continuing interest
in this piece of nineteenth century writing is Holmes's penchant for
pithy and memorable claims about the American common law.
Consider the following aphorisms taken from Holmes's essay:
[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction
that if a man does or omits certain things he will be
made to suffer in this or that wa,/ by judgment of
the court;-and so of a legal right. 2
If you want to know the law and nothing else,
you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for
the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds
his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, III the vaguer sanctions of
conscience. 26
The prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law. 27
No concrete proposition is self-evident, no
matter how ready we may be to accept it .... 28

Holmes, supra note 7, at 458.
Id.
26 Id. at 459.
27 Id. at 46l.
28 I d. at 466.

24

25
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It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past. 29

We have too little theory in the law rather than too
much .... 30
Holmes, in stating his VIews of the law, knew how to be
provocative.
What provokes my interest in The Path a/the Law is Holmes's
claim that we continually court confusion when we conflate legal
terms with moral terms, and his further claim that to avoid this
conflation of the legal domain with the moral or ethical universe,
we should keep these terms separate. H9lmes begins his
presentation of his position with the following remarks:
The first thing for a business-like understanding
of the matter is to understand its limits, and
therefore I think it desirable at once to point out and
dispel a confusion between morality and law, which
sometimes rises to the height of conscious theory,
and more often and indeed constantly is making
trouble in detail without reaching the point of
consciousness. 31
The confusion to which Holmes alludes is the conflation of
words or concepts that are used both in the law and in ethical or
moral contexts. The terms may look the same, but Holmes reminds
us that legal terms can, in fact, have meanings different than
similar-sounding (and similar-looking) moral or ethical terms.
Given that Holmes wants to make us conscious of this source of
confusion, what is its importance to us? Holmes believes that
clarifying and maintaining this distinction has important practical
and theoretical consequences.
The practical value of viewing the law in this Holmesian way
is that such a view reveals the true basis or foundation of law and
our legal system. Consider this fundamental question: Why does
29 !d. at 469.
30Id. at 476.
31Id. at 459.
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any person obey the law? Because it is the right thing to do?
Because we ought to obey it? These responses might be the wayan
ethicist or moral person would answer our fundamental question,
but Holmes's answer is quite different. He claims a more selfinterested reason for obedience of the law by citizens subject to its
reach: good persons as well as bad persons obey the law out of
fear. We fear the power of the state-we fear Leviathan-in that
we seek to avoid the state-sanctioned punishment that normally
attends any violation of the law. Holmes puts this point bluntly:
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as
much reason [motivation] as a good one for wishing
to avoid an encounter with the public force, and
therefore you can see the practical importance of the
distinction between morality and law. A man who
cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed
and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless
to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay
money, and will want to keep out of jail ifhe can. 32
It is an article of faith for Holmes that we humans are motivated by
a desire to avoid state sanctions. In this regard, every person (good
man, bad man, rich woman, poor woman) is interested in avoiding
the application of the state's monopoly on force or coercion.
It seems only practical, then, to view the law in this
unpretentious (even cynical) way. And this way of viewing the law
is exactly what Holmes advocates:

I have just shown the practical reason for saying
so. If you want to know the law and nothing else,
you must look at it as a bad man [i.e., a practical
person], who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in
the vaguer sanctions of conscience. The theoretical
importance of the distinction is no less, if you
would reason on your subject aright. 33
Before we turn to the theoretical importance of Holmes's
argument, let us review for a moment his practical reason for
32Id.
33Id.
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observing this line between law and morality. If we consider all of
the people within a legal system who are subject to its dictates,
then some unknown percentage of those people will be "outlaws"
or "outsiders"-exemplars of Holmes's paradigmatic "bad man."
And, according to Holmes, these people care only about the
material consequences of obeying or violating the law. Other
people subject to the same legal system may, of course, have an
"insider" and "internal" perspective on the law; they may obey the
law because of the dictates of their conscience, or because they
take law to have a normative hold. But it would seem that all of the
people involved in a legal system-whether they view the law as
outsiders or as insiders-will have, at a minimum, the object of
avoiding the application of the state's force to themselves.
Holmes's "bad man" standard for understanding legal behavior
seems practical, then, in the sense that it measures the law in terms
of the lowest common denominator concerning people's
motivation for following the law.
So far, we have considered what Holmes calls the practical
value of maintaining this distinction between law and morality.
Now what of the "theoretical importance of th[is] distinction,"
which Holmes says is "no less [important], if you would reason on
your subject" correctly? Holmes is not shy about his commitments
or his priorities in this regard: "I do say that that distinction
[between law and morals] is of the first importance for the object
which we are here to consider, -a right study and mastery of the
law as a business with well understood limits, a body of dogma
enclosed within definite lines.,,34 How exactly does Holmes
specify the theoretical importance of this distinction? He says:
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals,
and by the mere force of language continually
invites us to pass from one domain to the other
without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we
have the boundary constantly before our minds. The
law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and
intent, and negligence, and so forth, and nothing is
easier, or, I may say, more common in legal
reasoning, than to take these words in their moral
sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to drop
into fallacy. 35 .

34Id.
35 I d. at 459-60.
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Holmes avows frequently enough that these common words or
concepts-"rights,"
"duties,"
"malice,"
"intent,"
and
"negligence"-have different meanings or significance, depending
upon whether these terms are used in the legal world or in the
world of morality and ethics. For example: ''Nowhere is the
confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the
law of contract. Among other things, here again the so called
primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance
beyond what can be assigned and explained.,,36 Holmes's claim is
that if we contlate law with morality, then certain legal concepts
("rights," "duties," etc.) become "invested with a mystic
significance," out of all proportion to the actual legal sense or legal
significance that "can be assigned" to these concepts. Holmes
seeks to remove the mystification of these legal terms. How does
he do so?
Holmes's effort to demystify begins early in his essay,
although in subsequent pages his initial effort receives a number of
elaborations:
The primary rights and duties with which
jurisprudence busies itself again are nothing but
prophecies. -One of the many evil effects of the
confusion between legal and moral ideas, about
which I shall have something to say in a moment, is
that theory is apt to get the cart before the horse,
and to consider the right or the duty as something
existing apart from and independent of the
consequences of its breach, to which certain
sanctions are added afterward. But, as I shall try to
show, a legal duty so called is nothing but a
prediction that if a man does or omits certain things
he will be made to suffer in this or that way by
judgment of the court; -and so ofa legal right. 37
For Holmes, what makes a duty a legal duty is the relative
predictability that its breach or violation will have the material
consequence of the application of a state-imposed sanction. And
what makes a right a legal right, for Holmes, is the relative
predictability that its assertion or enforcement will have the
material consequence of the application of a state-imposed
sanction against any person or entity infringing that right.
36 Id. at 462.
37Id. at 458.
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In The Path of the Law, Holmes eternally returns to this
reductionist view of legal rights and legal duties. His view reduces
such rights and duties to their external or material consequences in
terms of the application or non-application of state-imposed
sanctions. This element in Holmes's tutorial vision of the law
evidences his faith in scientific progress, his sense that we need
external and objective measures of the law. According to Holmes,
we need to focus our attention on those aspects of phenomena that
we can scientifically test, measure, and confirm (or disconfirm).
Holmes adheres in this regard to the nineteenth century's faith in
scientific progress and scientific understanding in all things
human.
About the law in general, Holmes makes a similar (if more
general) reductionist proposal:

The confusion with which I am dealing besets
confessedly
legal
conceptions.
Take
the
fundamental question, What constitutes the law?
You will find some text writers telling you that it is
something different from what is decided by the
courts ... , that it is a system of reason, that it is a
deduction from principles of ethics or admitted
axioms or what not, which mayor may not coincide
with the decisions. But if we take the view of our
friend the bad man we shall find that he does not
care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but
that he does want to know what the . . . courts are
likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law. 38
What, then, is Holmes's theoretical solution for this problem-this
threatened confusion? How would Holmes bring clarity to this
situation?
He continues to elaborate his modest proposal:
I hope that my illustrations have shown the danger,
both to speculation [theory] and to practice, of
confounding morality with law, and the trap which
legal language lays for us on that side of our way.
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not
38

!d. at 460-61.
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be a gain if every word of moral significance could
be banished from the law altogether, and other
words adopted which should convey legal ideas
uncolored by anything outside the law. We should
lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and
the majesty got from ethical associations, but by
ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we
should ~ain very much in the clearness of our
thought. 9
It is hard to know just how serious Holmes's suggestion is, but

let us consider its two parts literally. First, we are to rid ourselves
of ("banish") what Holmes calls "every word of moral significance
... from the law." Short of collective amnesia, it is difficult to
conceive how this project might he accomplished. How exactly are
we to eliminate these words from our legal textbooks and from the
vocabulary of the law? Second, Holmes (perhaps more seriously)
proposes that we "adopt" new words-new terms-which carry
with them no moral or ethical connotations. This is a fairly
common suggestion made in the abstract when we humans wish to
clean up the seeming clutter of some area of our complicated lives
and language. But how often do we truly invent new words,
especially words without "extraneous" connotations (what Holmes
calls "other words . . . uncolored by anything outside the law")?
And even if we were to engage in such linguistic invention, once
we were to begin to use these new words and concepts, it remains
unclear how they should be able to withstand or avoid the natural
tendency of words to collect associations within our language.
These associations would inevitably include, I should think, ethical
or moral connections insofar as our uses of these words refer to or
connect with the ethical or moral elements in our lives.
Holmes seems oblivious to the difficulties inherent in the
actual implementation of his proposal. Rather, he blithely
recommends its beneficial consequences in terms of clarifying our
minds and our view of the Anglo-American common law. How
might we go about this process of "ridding ourselves of an
unnecessary confusion" that would enable us to "gain very much in
the clearness of our thought?,,4o Earlier in his address, Holmes
says: "You see how the vague circumference of the notion of duty
shrinks and at the same time grows more precise when we wash it
with cynical acid and expel everything except the object of our
39

[d. at 464.

40/d.
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study, the operations of the law.,,41 "But," Holmes adds in a forlorn
tone, "such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of
those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law
as they can. ,,42
As students of the law, we are advised by Holmes to avoid
making a mystery of the law. When we study the law, Holmes
says, we are apt to become confused if we fail to notice or mark
"the confusion between legal and moral ideas." This confusion in
our legal terms or concepts will be dissipated to the extent that we
are able to "assign" (or "explain") a more precise "significance" to
such terms or concepts. Holmes supposes that the precise legal
meaning or significance of various terms and ideas in the law does
not include any moral connotations or implications. Therefore,
Holmes proposes we clarify the practice of law by ridding legal
concepts of their moral counterparts-their moral "look-alikes"and turning law into a strictly scientific study: "You see how the
vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks and at the same
time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and
expel everything except the object of our study, the operations of
the law.,,43
I take it, then, that Mr. Justice Holmes wants to study law by
isolating it as the object of our attention, thereby intentionally
excluding all of the law's relations from its others (other practices,
other phenomena, other concepts). What might Wittgenstein say
about this modest proposal by Holmes?

III. WITTGENSTEIN ON CRITERIA AND LANGUAGE-GAMES
The vision of language in Wittgenstein's later philosophy
conflicts with Holmes's suggestion. Holmes wants us to draw or
enforce his preferred distinction by keeping legal terms separate
from moral terms. This enforced separation, from Wittgenstein's
perspective, would likely lead us to fail in reaching Holmes's
objective (i.e., clarification of meaning, reduction of confusion).
Put another way, from Wittgenstein's perspective, Holmes's
proposal is self-defeating. We could not sustain the distinction that
Holmes wishes us to draw if we were to follow his proposed
advice to keep separate legal terms from moral terms. Why not?
Because if-as Wittgenstein suggests--our words draw their
41 I d. at 461-62.
/d. at 462.
43Id. at 461-62.
42
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meaning from the other words with which they are associated and
are "at home," and if our words receive their semantic identity
from the contexts in which they are used (contexts and cases
Wittgenstein calls our "language-games"), then to separate our
words from one another will only produce semantic emptiness, not
semantic clarity.
To separate terms in our language from their associated terms,
or to attempt to substitute semantically neutral or "uncolored"
terms for semantically-laden terms, would be to render those words
not clear or unambiguous, but rather senseless. They would lack
the very semantic connections or conceptual relations that give our
words meaning. Therefore, if we were to follow Holmes's advice,
our actions would empty the words of the very content that Holmes
imagines himself striving to retain and to keep distinct).
In Part I of this article, I adduced some of Wittgenstein's
thoughts about our getting in our own way by entangling ourselves
and our minds in the workings of language, or by becoming
bewitched by the intricacies of our words and concepts. Now I
want to say something further about this aspect of Wittgenstein's
later philosophy.
In section 109 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein
tells us that philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our
intelligence, and then in section 115 he remarks that in the grip of
philosophical puzzlement, we may be held captive by something
he calls a "picture." Here, Wittgenstein seems to be describing our
situation or condition as one in which we are mesmerized by
words--entranced by our own thoughts about matters. In such a
fix, what does Wittgenstein recommend?
He immediately follows these remarks in the Investigations
with very specific advice:
When philosophers use a word-"knowledge",
"being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" -and
try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in
this way in the language-game which is its original
home?What we do is to bring words back from their
metaphysical to their everyday use. 44

44

WITIGENSTEIN,

supra note 5, § 116.
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Wittgenstein recommends bringing our minds (and ourselves) back
from the realm of metaphysics by bringing our words back from
that same realm. We are counseled to ask ourselves whether the
word that is giving us trouble is "ever actually used in this way in
the language-game which is its original home?" This passage
suggests that our minds run astray as and when our words go
astray. And it implies that it is up to us to corral our words, or to
shepherd them back into their ordinary contexts, their everyday
modes of being and existence. We cannot understand ourselves or
the world without understanding our language, and it is our
language that is the home-ground of our understanding. We must
bring our words back home-back home to us, where we live,
back to ourselves in our ordinary lives. This, too, is where our
words live and make sense.
In section 116 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein avers that
words have "language-games" that are the original home for those
word. What Wittgenstein means by "language-game" is contested
in the critical literature, but at a minimum it seems to involve a
conception of language that is in some sense holistic or contextual.
To understand a word or term or concept, we must understand the
cases or contexts in which it is used, and into which it can be
projected. Such contexts include both other words and the events
and actions surrounding our words and deeds.
At one point in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein
lists some sample language-games. Among those he mentions are
the following: "Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the
appearance of an object, or giving its measurementsConstructing an object from a description (a drawing)- Reporting
an event- Speculating about an event- Forming and testing a
hypothesis ... Guessing riddles- Making a joke; telling it ...
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.,,4 And in addition to
these specific linguistic activities, we might even speak of the
language-game of naming, or the language-game of pain, or the
language-game of describing, or the language-game of love. In this
regard, we would be referring to some collection of human
activities, expressions, and phenomena that Wittgenstein calls "the
whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is
woven.,,46 This particular aspect of Wittgenstein's vision of
language emphasizes that speaking and writing are as much
matters of human action as they are matters of human expression.
As Wittgenstein puts it, "Here the term 'language-game' is meant
45
46

I d. § 23, ~ c.
I d. § 7, ~ d.
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to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is
part of an activity, or of a fonn of life.,,47 And, of course,
Wittgenstein is known for having said: "For a large class of
cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word
'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use
in the language.',48 In parsing this proposed definition or
characterization of the meaning of a word, it seems important to
recognize that Wittgenstein's vision remains holistic or contextual.
He is, after all, speaking about the meaning of a word as being a
function of the word's use in the language. Of what else does our
language consist besides the associated tenns, expressions, and
actions that-taken together, holistically-we use in making
ourselves heard, in expressing ourselves, and in communicating
with others?
This brief commentary on language-games is cursory, I realize,
but I must be equally abrupt in sketching Wittgenstein's other
signature concepts-"grammar" and "criteria"-as they relate to
our project of trying to test Holmes's remark about separating legal
concepts from moral concepts. I am going to rely upon a single
passage, one drawn from The Blue Book, which consists of a set of
lecture notes that Wittgenstein prepared for his students at
Cambridge University in the 1930s:
We said that it was a way of examining the
grammar (the use) of the word "to know", to ask
ourselves what, in the particular case we are
examining, we should call "getting to know". There
is a temptation to think that this question is only
vaguely relevant, if relevant at all, to the question:
"what is the meaning of the word 'to know'?" We
seem to be on a side-track when we ask the question
"What is it like in this case 'to get to know'?" But
this question really is a question concerning the
grammar of the word "to know", and this becomes
clearer if we put it in the fonn: "What do we call
'getting to know'?" It is part of the grammar of the
word "chair" that this is what we call "to sit on a
chair", and it is part of the grammar of the word
"meaning" that this is what we call "explanation of
a meaning"; in the same way to explain my criterion
for another person's having toothache is to give a
47Id. § 23, ~ b.
48 !d. § 43, ~ a.
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grammatical explanation about the word
"toothache" and, in this sense, an explanation
concerning the meaning of the word "toothache. ,,49
In the second half of this quotation, Wittgenstein suggests that
one aspect of the concept of a chair is that we can use such an
object to sit on. Similarly, one aspect of the concept of "meaning"
is that we can explain the meaning of a word or concept; we give
and receive explanations of someone's meaning (what he or she
means by a particular word; what they meant by what they said;
etc.). And, of course, sometimes, despite our best efforts, our
attempted explanations of the meaning of a word fail. Wittgenstein
goes on to say, "to explain my criterion for another person's
having toothache is to give a grammatical explanation about the
word 'toothache. ",50
"Criteria," in Wittgenstein's sense--or, as Stanley Cavell calls
them in The Claim of Reason: "Wittgensteinian" or "grammatical"
criteria51 -help us to understand the grammar of our words and
concepts by characterizing those words and concepts and their
uses. It is part of the concept of "chair" that we sit on a chair.
Hence, in our grammar, the concept "chair" is tied to or associated
with, and therefore characterized by, the concept "sit" (or "sit on").
This is why, in summing up one portion of his presentation on
Wittgensteinian criteria, Cavell says that "'Wittgensteinian criteria
do not relate a name to an object, but various concepts to the
concept of that object.' I could also have said: They establish the
position of the concept of an 'object' in our system of concepts.,,52
How do Wittgensteinian criteria manage to do this?
Cavell indicates that Wittgensteinian criteria relate a series or
number of words (concepts) to the concept of an object by forming
a language-game. In this respect, Wittgensteinian or grammatical
criteria afford us the terms by which we approach any given
concept. "[C]riteria are the means by which we learn what our
concepts are.,,53 These associated words are the linguistic means by
which we come to know and use the concept in question-the
49 LUDWIG WITIGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 23-24 (Harper &
. Row 1958).
50 I d.
5l STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 72 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979)
("Wittgensteinian or (as I will now begin calling them) grammatical criteria are
not marks or features which require special training or a specialized
environment to have mastered, whereas Austinian (non-grammatical) criteria
do").
52Id. at 76.
53Id. at 16.
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concept sketched and staked out by the terms with which this
concept is associated (and by which the concept is characterized).
So, for example, Cavell notes: "Where 'call' comes in there, it
introduces a phrase in which the word to be eXElained is used; i.e.,
it associates a concept with other concepts." 4 The grammatical
criteria of a concept form its conditions of employment and its
conditions of intelligibility in the sense that its aggregate
conceptual associates are the means by which we learn (by which
we come to know) this concept, and by which we come to use this
concept within our lives and our language.
Cavell illustrates his reconstructive reading of Wittgenstein by
way of an extended example concerning our concept of a chair:
"It is part of the grammar of the word 'chair'
that this is what we call 'to sit on a chair' ...." That
you use this object that way, sit on it that way, is
our criterion for calling it a chair. You can sit on a
cigarette, or on a thumb tack, or on a flag pole, but
not in that way. Can you sit on a table or a tree
stump in that (the "grammatical") way? Almost;
especially if they are placed against a wall. That is,
you can use a table or a stump as a chair (a place to
sit; a seat) in a way you cannot use a tack as a chair.
But so can you use a screw-driver as a dagger; that
won't make a screw-driver a dagger. What can serve
as a chair is not a chair, and nothing would (be said
to) serve as a chair if there were no (were nothing
we called) (orthodox) chairs. We could say: It is
part of the grammar of the word "chair" that this is
what we call "to serve as a chair."

The force "of such remarks is something like
this: If you don't know all this, and more, you don't
know what a chair is; what "chair" "means"; what
we call a chair; what it"is you would be certain of
(or almost_c~'rtain of, or doubt \reiy much) if you,
were certairf(or "almost certain, or doubt very much) .
that something isachair. 55

54Id. at 70. Cavell's reference to the term "call" is his further specification
of some of the implications in the quotation from THE BLUE BOOK, supra note
49.
55Id" at 71.

[VOL. 2.252

JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW

272

We come to learn what the word "chair" means in our
language, as well as what a chair is in our world, by coming to
know these little things-these seemingly insignificant (or barely
significant) facts-about what we say about chairs and how we use
chairs. And notice that in Cavell's example, there are certain
associated or cognate concepts repeatedly tied with our use of the
word "chair"-concepts such as "serve," "sit," "place," "seat," and
so on. These ordinary words or concepts are what we humans use
in characterizing what we understand or take to be a chair in our
world and our language.
. Our words and concepts have their place or "home" among the
myriad relations and connections that constitute our language. And
so we find Wittgenstein saying: "When philosophers use a word'knowledge', 'being', 'object', '1', 'proposition', 'name'-and try
to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is
the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game
which is its original home?"s6 When we allow ourselves to speak
(or when we find ourselves driven or forced to speak) outside of
our normal, natural language-games, then we are apt to allow
ourselves to say something that we do not (and cannot) mean there
and then. On such occasions, although we have the illusion of
making sense, we are speaking emptily or, as Wittgenstein puts it
early on in the Investigations, we are speaking "outside of a
particular language-game."s7 This domestic imagery suggests that
our words are tethered to the world by means of the criteria we
have for their use and invocation. So, too, we tether ourselves (our
minds and our bodies) to the world through our use and invocation
of our words. This is how we humans fashion a haven in this
world.

IV. TESTING HOLMES'S MODEST PROPOSAL
I mentioned earlier that Holmes states in The Path of the Law
that legal terms have different meanings than similar-looking
moral terms. How does Holmes know this? In other words, what
linguistic or grammatical knowledge does Holmes have in this
regard, and where did he come into its possession? Or put another
way, consider this: When the word "duty" (or the word "right")
appears in a sentence in English, how does Holmes know-and
how do we know-whether that word is being used in its legal
sense or in its moral sense? If you ask yourself these questions, I
56 WmGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 116"
a.
57Id. § 47, , d.
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think you'll respond by saytng that his knowledge (and our
knowledge) of such matters is based upon the other words
associated with the key word, as well as the context in which these
words are used or into which these words are being projected. In
Wittgenstein's lingo, these two factors are roughly what he means
by his critical vocabulary, "criteria" and "language-games."
I realize that eventually Holmes wishes to translate or reduce
the meaning of legal terms to their external signs or material
consequences. 58 Yet initially, in grouping or categorizing the
similar-looking terms into different classes of legal uses and moral
or ethical uses, Holmes does not-and we do not-use any such
material bases for distinguishing or classifying these terms.
Instead, he uses-and we use-the ordinary linguistic criteria and
our intuitive sense of contextual propriety that we inherit and
develop when we become initiates of a natural language as one of
its native speakers.
To test my contention, I would like to consider at slightly
greater length a few argumentative points that Holmes makes in
favor of his preferred way of understanding the Anglo-American
common law system. Remember the remark from Holmes that
[t]he law is full of phraseology drawn from morals,
and by the mere force of language continually
invites us to pass from one domain to the other
without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we
have the boundary constantly before our minds. The
law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and
intent, and negligence, and so forth .... 59
This list of five terms roughly parallels the series of examples
and cases that Holmes invokeslatet in his essay as a way of
instructing us about the need to draw the distinction between law
and morality. Here, rather than considering all five instances, let us
limit ourselves to two of Holmes's most elaborate examples
offered in support of his argument.
First, consider what Holmes s~ys. about. rights, both moral and
.
.' .. '.
"
.. - .
legal:
For instance, when we speak of the rights of man in
a moral sense, we mean to mark the limits of

58

Holmes, supra note 7, at 460-61; see also supra text accompanying notes

37-38.
59

Holmes, supra note 7, at 459-60.
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interference with individual freedom which we
think are prescribed by conscience, or our ideal,
however reached. Yet it is certain that many laws
have been enforced in the past, and it is likely that
some are enforced now, which are condemned by
the most enlightened opinion of the time, or which
at all events pass the limit of interference as many
consciences would draw it. Manifestly, therefore,
nothing but confusion of thought can result from
assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are
equally rights in the senSe of the Constitution and
the law. 6o

-""
•
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,"
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In speaking about "the rights of man in a moral sense," Holmes
uses, in this context at least, the following several associated words
or cognate phrases: he says that moral rights deal with "limits of
interference" as to "individual freedom" which we think are
"prescribed" by "conscience," or our "ideal." Holmes uses these
specific terms to characterize the notion of human rights in its
moral or ethical dimension. Holmes's invocation of these terms
confirms Wittgenstein's claim that we rely on our criteriological
cognate concepts, along with the contexts ("language-games") in
which we use them (or refuse to use them), as the means by which
we make meaning through the medium of our language.
It appears to me that-in practice-Holmes uses the
grammatical tools that Wittgenstein would suggest we all have and
use in coming to a fuller consciousness of the resources and riches
of our inherited language (including our inherited language of the
Anglo-American common law). I am suggesting that these five
aspects of human rights, taken cumulatively, help us to identify
one notion of human rights as JIaving a place or a function within a.
moral or ethical ambit. I should note, however, that I am not saying
that anyone of these five associated concepts or phrases is solely .
moral in its semantic influence or effect. It remains true (and is
equaJIy important to note) that some or all of .these same five
-concepts may-also have 'a place or function in a -legal universe as'
"Well: That is, these same words or concepts can doworkiri tlie-law
_as t~ey do in morality. Indeed, the similarity of use (or of operation
. or function) is what makes it possible to cont1ate these words in the
first place.
At this stage in our understanding of these words, no one thing
that Holmes has shown us has been decisive with regard to our
6°Id. at 460.
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ability to draw a line between a moral orbit and a legal orbit for the
concept of "the rights of man.,,61 All I wish to claim here is that it
is through the use or invocation of these five key words or phrases
that Holmes is able to so much as draw his distinction and make
his point vis-a-vis moral rights being distinct from legal rights (on
at least some occasions, in at least some contexts). The words or
concepts that Holmes invokes-not the material consequences or
any other "external" indicia-allow him to propound his plausible
claim that the "same" words or concepts have different meanings
in moral contexts than they have in legal contexts.
Similarly, consider how Holmes speaks about the concept of
malice (again, with regard to both its moral and its legal
dimensions):
I mentioned, as other examples of the use by the
law of words drawn from morals, malice, intent,
and negligence. It is enough to take malice as it is
used in the law of civil liability for wrongs, -what
we lawyers call the law of torts, -to show you that
it means something different in law from what it
means in morals, and also to show how the
difference has been obscured by giving to principles
which have little or nothing to do with each other
the same name . . . . [I]n my opinion at least, the
word ["malice" as used in the law of torts] means
nothing about motives, or even about the
defendant's attitude toward the future, but only
signifies that the tendency of his conduct under the
known circumstances was very plainly to cause the
plaintiff temporal harm. 62
As to this apparent distinction between malice in a moral sense
and malice in a legal sense, Holmes once again relies implicitly
upon an appeal to certain associated concepts. Moments later in his
essay, for example, Holmes states: "Morals deal with the actual
internal state of the individual's mind, what he actually intends.,,63
In coimecting this remark with Holmes's preceding attempt to
distinguish between a moral and a legal connotation of the word
"malice," we can see that in Holmes's formulation set forth in the
text accompanying footnote 62, he explicitly dissociates the
61Id. at 460 and accompanying text.
62Id. at 463.
63Id.
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concepts of motivation and mental attitude from legal malice.
Negating these conceptual cognates of moral malice makes
plausible Holmes's assertion concerning the difference between
the moral signification and the legal signification of the word
"malice."
In fact, I believe that these associated concepts are what help us
to conjure up either the moral or the legal world into which the
word "malice" might be intelligibly projected (when, that is, we
are invoking the concept of malice in terms of considering or
judging a person's actions to be either malicious or not). Again,
these Wittgensteinian conceptual criteria (to which Holmes refers
as he attempts to draw his distinction) seem to be the actual sociolinguistic bases on which Holmes unwittingly relies in order to
make his point.

v. DRAWING A MORAL
Holmes could not do' what he claims to want' to do----:<lraw a:
'clear distinction between legal terms and moral terms-without
invoking the grammatical, criteriological means that ordinary
language makes available to us. Holmes also says that he wants to
expel such material from our language, as though that would
clarify things, but ridding ourselves of such socio-linguistic
material would only blind us. It would remove the bases we have
for drawing the distinction in the first place. This distinction is not
merely theoretical; it exists in our lives and in our actual language.
Perhaps it makes sense, then, that we should avail ourselves of the
living conceptual material by which the distinction maintains its
thriving existence.
To the extent that Holmes advises us, or his student audience,
to, ignore the conceptual associations that the concept of law has
(associations, for example, that it may have with the concept of
morality or other concepts in ethics), Holmes is telling us to ignore
the actual conceptual relations and connections-the grammatical
criteria-,that can inform us about the nature of the concept of law:
When I 'emphasize 'the difference between law and, .
morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of
learning and understanding the law. For that·
purpose you must definitely master its specific
marks, and it is for that [reason] that I ask you for
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the moment to imagine yourselves indifferent to
other and greater things. 64
Holmes's plea for a studied "indifference" misconceives how
we might ever achieve a more clear understanding of the concept
of law (or its associated conceptual cognates). In effect, Holmes
asks us to shun exactly the kind of grammatical knowledge to
which I referred earlier in my discussion of Wittgenstein's later
work. Holmes wants us to rid ourselves of these criteria, because
they complicate (he says "confuse") our understanding. But do
they? Or are they, instead, the only means available for clarifying
our minds and dissipating our confusion? The latter response is, I
think, what Wittgenstein would care to maintain.
Holmes's modest proposal that "every word of moral
significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other
words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by
anything outside the law,,65 expresses a tempting fantasy-one that
promises clarity. This is an attractive, even seductive offer. If we
were to follow Holmes's advice, however, we would thereby lose
the conceptual relations and connections that keep our concept of
law in balance and in play. From Holmes's perspective, such a loss
seems small indeed: "We should lose the fossil records of a good
deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but
by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain
very much in the clearness of our thought.,,66 Would that it were
true. The "fossil records," the "ethical associations," the
''unnecessary'' complexity or confusion of terms are all another
way of describing the grammatical criteria that we have for guiding
ourselves and our concepts through this complicated life and world
of ours.
Stanley Cavell describes the alternative vision of language that
we find in Wittgenstein's later philosophy:
Wittgenstein's idea of a criterion [is used by
Wittgenstein] .... in connection with his idea of
grammar, to describe, in a sense to explain, how
language relates (to) things, how things fall under
our concepts, how we individuate things and name,
settle on nameables, why we call things as we doquestions of how we determine what counts a~
Id. at 459.
Id. at 464.
66 Id.
64

65
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instances of our concepts, this thing as a table, that
as a chair, this other as a human, that other as a god.
To speak is to say what counts. 67
Wittgenstein would, as I understand him, reject Holmes's
counsel to shun our criteria for the employment of our legal and
moral concepts. To tell these concepts apart, or to draw the very
distinctions that Holmes wishes us to draw, we must consult the
specific indicia-the conceptual associations, the fossil records of
our language (as memorialized and catalogued, for example, in the
Oxford English Dictionary), and the linguistic connections-that
Holmes wishes us to rid ourselves of.
Wittgenstein's counter-counsel is daunting. It reminds us that
there is no easy means of clarifying our thought-no short-cut to
achieving clarity. Instead, by reminding ourselves of what we say
in various circumstances, we once again must try to "bring words
back from their metaphysical to their everyday use," and thereby
re-Iocate the concepts that puzzle us by re-situating those concepts
within the "original language-games" that form their home. 68 In
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the repetitive work of clarification
is interminable, at least in the sense in which (as Cavell puts it)
"nothing short of the powers of each word in the language is
sufficient to understand the powers of language. ,,69
Taking Holmes's advice would remove from the scene and our
language the very means by which we daily continue to draw the
line between law and morality (a line which Holmes wishes us to
maintain). From Wittgenstein's perspective, as I read him, to do
without these means would be to do without our ordinary lives and
our ordinary world, including the world of Anglo-American
common law.
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